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ABSTRACT
Detecting reliably copy-move forgeries is difficult because
images do contain similar objects. The question is : how
to discard natural image self-similarities while still detect-
ing copy-moved parts as being “unnaturally similar”? Copy-
move may have been performed after a rotation, a change of
scale and followed by JPEG compression or the addition of
noise. For this reason, we base our method on SIFT, which
provides sparse keypoints with scale, rotation and illumina-
tion invariant descriptors. To discriminate natural descrip-
tor matches from artificial ones, we introduce an a contrario
method which gives theoretical guarantees on the number of
false alarms. We validate our method on several databases.
Being fully unsupervised it can be integrated into any generic
automated image tampering detection pipeline.
Index Terms— Sift, copy-move, a-contrario, forgery
1. INTRODUCTION
Photo and video editing includes the insertion or removal of
parts of the image, often performed by internal or external
copy-move operations. The Poisson editing technique [1, 2]
allows for seamless insertions and is now routinely used for
special effects in movies, in software like Photoshop or in
popular mobile phone applications. Most editing operations
are driven by aesthetic goals. Yet their usage can easily be-
come malicious and help forging false evidence, fake news,
or alter results in scientific publications [3].
It is therefore of primary importance to provide public and
professionals with reliable scientific tools detecting traces of
any intentional alteration of a photograph. Several different
techniques are relevant here: image splicing (internal or ex-
ternal) can be detected through its local alterations of the com-
pression encoding and of the JPEG blocks [4, 5, 6], its incon-
sistent demosaicking traces [7, 8, 9], or directly [10, 11, 12].
Methods tracking other features such as noise inconsistencies,
lightning inconsistencies, chromatic aberration inconsisten-
cies, etc. were listed in the broad review [13].
Our paper focuses on a specific type of image splicing
called “copy-move”. As its name indicates it consists in copy-
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ing a region of the image and pasting it somewhere else. Rota-
tion, scaling, change of contrasts and other manipulations are
sometimes applied to the piece being copied before pasting
it. The method can be used to replicate objects, but some-
times also to hide an object by a texture borrowed elsewhere
in the image. Copy-move detection methods can be divided
into two main categories: Block-based and keypoint-based.
The block-based approaches try to match regions by blocks.
In order to match the blocks more easily and more efficiently
it is frequent to represent the block in a compact form by di-
mensionality reduction, e.g. with PCA, DCT [5] or DWT
[14]. The compact representation may also ensure the in-
variance of the detection to rotations by using Zernike mo-
ments [15, 16] or a similarity invariance with the Fourier-
Mellin transform [17, 18]. These methods generally manage
to detect the forged regions, but are computationally demand-
ing. Instead of directly trying to match blocks, featured-based
methods compute sets of keypoints and then match these key-
points. Many of these methods are based on SIFT [19, 20] or
SURF [21]. The descriptors associated to the keypoints are
invariant to rotation, scaling and even moderate affine dis-
tortions. Yet, precisely out of too much robustness, these
methods may cause false detections when similar objects are
present in an image. As argued in [22], most methods there-
fore suffer from a false positive problem caused by the occur-
rence of “natural” self-similarity. This is the problem that we
attempt to tackle here.
Section 2 introduces our method and Section 3 shows ex-
perimental results on different datasets. Finally perspectives
are going to be presented in Section 4.
2. COPY-MOVE MATCHINGWITH SIFT-LIKE
MATCHING
Like in the SIFT algorithm [23] we start by computing a set of
sparse keypoints. These keypoints are usually located in tex-
tured regions. Then a descriptor is associated to each of these
keypoints. Finally the descriptors are matched to each other
to define the detection. These three steps are summarized in
the next paragraphs.
2.1. Keypoints
The keypoints correspond to the extrema of the normalized
Laplacian scale-space. In practice they are computed using
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differences of Gaussians. The positions of the maxima are
then found for each scale. To each keypoint is associated a
scale and a principal orientation. A more detailed analysis
can be found in [24].
2.2. Descriptors
This first, classic, SIFT step gives a list K = (ki) of key-
points. From each of these keypoints (consisting of a spatial
position, a scale and an orientation), a square patch pi of size
(N + 2) × (N + 2) can be sampled. The gradients in both
directions are then computed from these patches yielding an
N ×N gradient patch Di with vector values (∂pi∂x , ∂pi∂y ).
Contrary to SIFT, we keep these matrices for the matching
step. Indeed, using histograms of gradients (HOGs) to repre-
sent the gradient patch would be too robust a representation
and lead to the detection of natural repetitions. Hence, follow-
ing [25] and [26]. we encode the key point ki by its gradient
patch Di. This allows for an invariance to uniform illumi-
nation changes. In SIFT, the descriptors are computed on a
grayscale version of the image for matching applications. In
the forgery case, it is interesting to consider all information
available. So our gradient descriptors keep three channels,
one for each color. For simplicity our matching step will be
presented using a grayscale descriptor, but extends immedi-
ately to color as well. Color descriptors will be used for the
experiments in Section 3.
2.3. Matching
Two naturally similar objects are rarely exactly similar. This
is because there are always differences in their illumination
in a real scene, and physical differences that do not nec-
essarily catch the eye, in addition to the acquisition noise.
Our matching process takes advantage of these serious vari-
ations to discriminate between similar objects and digital
copies. Consider two keypoints ki and kj located respec-
tively on the original object and on the forged copy, so that
they match with a regular matching method such as SIFT
[23] or [26]. In that case the descriptors Di and Dj associ-
ated to these keypoints should be exactly the same, namely
∀k, l ∈ {1, . . . , N},Dik,l = Djk,l. Of course this perfect
quality is not reached in practice. Several copy-move steps
could introduce small differences such as: the interpolation
due to a rotation or zoom or even a post-processing step
such as the addition of noise and/or a compression after
forgery. Nevertheless, we can enforce a very close match
between each part of the descriptors by an exigence like
∀k, l ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ‖Dik,l − Djk,l‖22 6 τ . For the distance
dmax defined by
dmax(Di,Dj) = max
k,l∈{1,...,N}
‖Dik,l −Djk,l‖22, (1)
the suspicious match test is simply dmax(Di,Dj) 6 τ .
The key question is to fix the right detection threshold
τ , to have a matching criterion that rejects genuinely similar
Fig. 1. On the left image the two objects are similar but not
digital copies of each other. On the right, one is a digital copy
of the other. The patches shown below each respective image
correspond to the red dots in the images. They show that a
difference is visible at this level and therefore the descriptors
can be discriminated. This is why the detection method can
discard genuinely similar objects.
objects while still detecting well copy-move forgeries. This
threshold can be computed rigorously using the a-contrario
theory [27] which is a probabilistic formalization of the non-
accidentalness principle [28]. This principle has shown its
practical use for detection purposes such as segment detec-
tion [29], vanishing points detection [30] and anomaly detec-
tion [31]. The a-contrario theory provides a way to compute
automatically detection thresholds while having a control on
the number of false alarms (NFA). It replaces the usual p-
value by drawing into account the number of tests and there-
fore controlling the overall number of false alarms in a given
detection task. The method only requires a simple a contrario
stochastic model on the perturbation. We will consider for
now that Di and Dj are derived from the same patch but one
of them has been corrupted by Gaussian noise of variance σ2
i.e. since the descriptors consist of gradients ∀k, l,Djk,l =
Dik,l + nk,l where nk,l ∼ N (0, 2σ2) and are independent.
Matching both descriptors requires that maxk,l n2k,l 6 τ . The
probability of matching in this case is then
P
(
max
k,l
n2k,l 6 τ
)
=
∏
k,l
P
(
n2k,l 6 τ
)
= P
(
n 6 τ
2σ2
)N2
(2)
where n follows a χ2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom.
We can therefore control the number of false detections by
choosing the proper τ according to
τ = 2σ2 × chi2inv
(
N2
√

Ntests
)
, (3)
where  is the number of false alarms per Ntests number of
tests and chi2inv is inverse of the χ2 cumulative distribution
function. The main point of formula (3) is that it reduces the
initial method dependency on many detection parameters to
just one, namely σ. We can argue that this last one is not crit-
ical. Indeed, even though the dependency on σ is strong, as
long as the degradation is not too large, there will be a scale
in which σ is small enough so the detection will work: indeed
σ is divided by two at each octave in the SIFT method. For
example, this exigent threshold can work for a noise of 4, but
requires the tampered area to be four times larger for a de-
tection. It might be objected that zooming down also makes
naturally similar objects become more similar. Yet our exper-
iments indicate that this is not the case, indeed their small but
significant differences encompass all scales. To summarize,
granting that we allow for one false detection on average on
a set of images, the method is parameterless as it adapts to
the number of tests and to the patch size. Of course it might
be coupled with an automatic noise estimator to give an good
guess of σ. Assuming a perturbation noise of variance σ2 = 1
and the use of descriptors of size 4×4×3 (derived from 6×6
color patches), a number of false alarms of  = 1 and testing
on 100 images with on average 50 keypoints (this corresponds
to the COVERAGE dataset presented in Section 3), Equation
(3) gives τ = 2.9. The advantage of using color descriptors in
this case is either to increase the size of the descriptor (allow-
ing for a larger τ and detecting more) or to reduce the spatial
size for a same size of descriptor (allowing to detect smaller
forgeries).
An interesting side effect is that this test is really fast to
compute. Indeed to detect forgeries each keypoint must to
compared against all others. Since we are comparing key-
points inside a single image this gives (K−1)(K−2)2 pairs to
be tested, where K is the number of descriptors. (Of course
all descriptor self-matches are discarded). For large images
the computation of the distance becomes quickly a bottleneck
for distances that are costly. In our case it is not necessary to
compute dmax before doing the test, the test can be done dur-
ing the computation of dmax which allows for early stopping.
Since most keypoints won’t match, the number of operations
done per comparison is in practice much smaller than the size
N2 of the descriptor. An experimental verification of this fact
is made in Section 3.
Finally we need to take into account all possible flips for
the forged regions. While the matching process doesn’t detect
flips it is possible to still detect them at the cost of a few more
computations. The modified distance to test flips is then
dflip(Di,Dj) = max
k,l
(
xik,l − xjk,l
)2
+
(
yik,l + y
j
N−k+1,l
)2
(4)
where Dk,l = (xk,l, yk,l). Indeed when flipped, the indexes
in one direction are reversed but also the gradients in that di-
rection are opposite. Thanks to the rotation invariance all flips
are taken into account by just testing the flip in one direction
(in our case in the y direction). In the end, we test each pair of
Table 1. Detection statistics on the different datasets com-
pared to the reported results from [22]. The proposed method
achieves similar true positive detections for a very limited
number of false detections. The only false detection is shown
in 3. The false detections are computed on the original images
(with no forgeries).
Dataset Method
True
detections
False
detections
COVERAGE Proposed 43% 1%
Previous 50.5% -
GRIP Proposed 70% 1.3%
Previous 71% -
IM Proposed 81.2% 0%
Previous 75% -
IM JPEG80 Proposed 64.6% 0%
IM NOISE20 Proposed 79.2% 0%
keypoints with both distances to take into account flips. Hav-
ing to do twice the computation is not a problem in practice
as each test is very efficient.
3. EXPERIMENTS
In this section the images are all shown in grayscale even
though they are originally in color. This allows for a better
visualization of the matches. Nevertheless, the descriptors
were color descriptors. We present results on three different
datasets: GRIP [15], Image Manipulation (IM) [32] and COV-
ERAGE [22] which is the dataset that inspired this study as it
focuses on distinguishing forgeries from similar but genuine
objects. All images shown in this section come from these
datasets.
We decided to use descriptors of size 3× 8× 8 for the IM
dataset and 3 × 4 × 4 otherwise as the images from the IM
dataset are much larger than the ones from the other datasets.
Indeed the size of the descriptors needs be chosen so to be
smaller than the expected size of the forged regions. Each
time the threshold was computed using Equation (3) from
Section 2.3. We also verified that the number of comparisons
done to compare two descriptors was much smaller than the
size of a descriptor. For example for the image shown in Fig-
ure 1, of size 424 × 421 and containing 207 descriptors only
1.1 comparisons were necessary on average for a descriptor
size of 3× 6× 6 = 108 that is almost the size of the descrip-
tor used for SIFT. Thus the detection is really fast even for
large images with a large number of keypoints.
Table 1 shows that while the methods focuses on being ro-
bust to similar objects and reduces as much as possible false
detections, it is actually competitive with previous keypoint
Fig. 2. Examples of forgeries that were successfully detected
in the different datasets. From the top to bottom, left to right:
an example with a rotation, a change of illumination, a change
of scale and with JPEG compression.
based methods. Moreover, the number of false alarm is defi-
nitely under control : only very little false alarms were found
in all three datasets. One of these false detection is shown
in Figure 3. We also verified that while robust to similar ob-
jects (and therefore very precise) the method still is robust to
reasonable noise and compression.
Figure 2 shows different examples of successful detec-
tions. The method is able to detect well rotation, uniform
illumination changes, scaling and compression. As can be
seen, the more texture the forged region has the easier it is to
detect. This is because a textured region will generate more
keypoints and therefore will increase its chances of matching.
Figure 3 shows several failure examples. Most failures
come from the fact that the method can’t deal with more
severe distortions such as a tilt or non-uniform illumination
change. The method also fails to detect flat regions, as no
keypoints are computed on these regions. As for the false
detection, it does not contradict the a contrario model. We
requested at most  = 1 false detection per 100 images with
the threshold given in Section 2.3, and we found one with
200 images tested for the COVERAGE dataset.
4. PERSPECTIVES
In this paper we have presented an unsupervised method to
detect copy-move forgeries that is not only invariant to rota-
tion, scaling and global change of illumination, but also ro-
Fig. 3. Examples of forgeries that were not successfully de-
tect in the different datasets. From top to bottom, left to right:
an example where the forged region is completely flat, with
a non-uniform change of illumination, with a tilt applied and
the false detection.
bust to the presence of similar but genuinely different objects
or regions. The method, being parameter-less and very fast,
can be included in the necessary long series of tampering tests
applied to a suspicious image.
The limits of the method are closely linked to its strength.
Because it is robust to the presence of naturally similar ob-
jects, it is less reliable in case of large degradation of a copied
digital ones. We nevertheless found that the method is ro-
bust enough to usual noise and compression levels. An image
that has been degraded too much is suspicious anyway, since
nowadays the quality of an image taken with a mobile is very
good. Thus only images with a good enough quality should be
tested. Highly degraded images would be anyway suspicious
regardless of any such more sophisticated examination. The
second limit is the usage of sparse keypoints. These keypoints
are only computed in regions that are contrasted enough (non-
flat areas) which means that forgeries in these regions might
not detected. Finally matching keypoints give anchor points
and do not delimit forged regions precisely. A natural exten-
sion of the method would be to extract the forged regions from
the anchor points while still keeping a good control over the
number of false detections. Finally coupling the method with
a noise estimator could arguably make it still more discrimi-
nant.
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